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[This article examines recent European jurisprudence on the rights of transsexuals 
to privacy and marriage.  The authors argue that Australia’s obligations under the 
ICCPR should be understood in light of this jurisprudence.  On this basis, Australia 
is obliged to ensure that its authorities: (a) legally recognise the changed gender of 
post-operative transsexuals; and (b) permit the marriage of post-operative trans-
sexuals to persons of the opposite gender to their re-assigned gender. The authors 
note the continuing uncertainty around the extension of these rights to transsexuals 
who have not had ‘surgery’ but argue in favour of extending ICCPR rights in this 
way. The authors also consider the legal situation regarding privacy and marriage 
for transsexuals in Australia.  Like the international jurisprudence, Australian laws 
have not dealt with the situation of transsexuals who have not had surgery.  The 
authors argue that legal distinctions based on the surgical model are more about 
providing certainty than they are about ensuring the rights and dignity of the people 
affected.  Given Australia’s human rights obligations, it would be more appropriate 
for consideration to be given to the full range of social and cultural factors that 
affect whether a person is considered to be a man or a woman.]      
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I INTRODUCTION 
As a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
Australia has agreed to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and jurisdiction, the rights recognised in that Convention, without distinction of any 
kind.1  People who identify as transsexual or transgender2 are entitled to enjoy these 
rights, along with other members of society. 
Like any law, the obligations in the ICCPR are open to interpretation.  Many of the 
articles in the ICCPR are in similar, if not identical terms to the obligations in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (European Convention on Human Rights).  Accordingly, developments in the 
European jurisprudence are relevant to understanding the obligations in the 
ICCPR.3 
Recently, there have been significant developments in the European jurisprudence 
regarding the right of transsexuals to private life and to marry.  In this paper, we 
will examine this jurisprudence and consider its relevance for Australia.  We will 
note that while this jurisprudence is a significant step forward, we hope that courts 
will continue to keep this issue under review.  To date, the jurisprudence has fo-
cused on the legal rights of post-operative transsexuals.  The situation of transsexu-
als who have not had surgery is yet to be considered. 
In the Australian context, we will look at privacy and State and Territory laws 
regarding birth certificates.  We also consider the law relating to marriage in Aus-
tralia in light of a recent Full Federal Court decision.   
II THE ICCPR IN AUSTRALIA 
The ICCPR came into effect generally in 1976 and for Australia in 1980.  In some 
countries, the ICCPR has been directly incorporated into domestic law.  As a result, 
the domestic courts in those countries can adjudicate issues such as whether a 
particular right has been breached.  This is not the case in Australia.   
                                                        
1
  Article 2(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1980 ATS 23.  The ICCPR entered 
into force generally (except Article 41) on 23 March 1976, and for Australia (except for Article 41) on 
13 November 1980.  Article 41 (Inter-State Communications before the Human Rights Committee) came 
into force generally on 28 March 1979, and for Australia on 28 January 1993.   
2
  In this article, the term ‘transsexual’ is used as a convenient shorthand to describe people who strongly 
identify themselves as belonging to the gender opposite to that which they were assigned at birth and 
who express a consistent desire to live in their chosen gender.  The legal status of individuals who 
identify as belonging to a third gender or no gender is beyond the scope of this article.   
3
  Dr Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary (2000)  XXIII. 
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In Australia, treaties do not form part of the domestic law unless and until they are 
incorporated by statute.4  The ICCPR is annexed to the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission Act 1994 (Cth).  The Human Rights and Equal Opportu-
nity Commission (HREOC) can inquire into any Commonwealth act or practice that 
may be inconsistent with or contrary to an ICCPR right.  HREOC can report on its 
findings to the Attorney General, and these reports must be tabled in Parliament.  
However, HREOC is not a court and its findings do not have the status of judicial 
determinations.  As the ICCPR is not directly incorporated into Australian law (for 
example, as a bill of rights), it is not possible for Australian courts to adjudicate 
breaches of ICCPR rights.   
Australia is a party to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.5  This gives indi-
viduals who consider their rights have been breached by Australian authorities the 
ability to complain to the UN Human Rights Committee about their treatment.  The 
Human Rights Committee considers these complaints (‘communications’) and then 
expresses its views on the issue at hand.  These views provide useful guidance on 
the content of ICCPR rights.  For example, in 1994, the Human Rights Committee 
expressed the view that Tasmania’s laws criminalising sodomy breached the right to 
privacy.  That year, the Federal Government enacted the Human Rights (Sexual 
Conduct) Act 1994, effectively preventing State Governments from prosecuting 
sodomy offences. 
To date, the Human Rights Committee has not considered the rights of people who 
identify as transsexual or transgender.  As a result, there is no Human Rights Com-
mittee jurisprudence on this issue. 
A How do we interpret the ICCPR obligations? 
The ICCPR is subject to the rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.6  Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that treaties: 
…shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose. 
The context includes the preamble and the annexes to the treaty. 
Clearly, the starting point for interpreting the ICCPR is the text of the treaty itself.  
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty are to be 
                                                        
4
  See for example, Mason CJ and Deane J in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 
183 CLR 273. 
5
 1991 ATS 39.  The First Optional Protocol entered into force generally on 23 March 1976, and for 
Australia on 25 December 1991. 
6
 1974 ATS 2.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties entered into force generally and for 
Australia on 27 January 1980. 
 312   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 9 NO 2 
 
given their ordinary meaning.  The ordinary meaning of terms must not be deter-
mined in the abstract but in light of the object and purpose of the ICCPR.7   
It is not always easy to determine the “ordinary meaning” of terms in the ICCPR.  
Words like ‘privacy’ and ‘marriage’ have many different meanings, depending on 
the time and place of usage.  On one view, the “ordinary meaning” of a term is its 
meaning at the time the ICCPR was negotiated.  However, this view is inconsistent 
with the requirement in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that meaning 
be determined in light of the treaties object and purpose.  The ICCPR exists to 
protect human rights and our understanding of human rights is not static.  There are 
many examples of ‘rights’ that were once considered radical and that are now main-
stream.  This suggests that, at least in the context of the ICCPR, the ordinary mean-
ing of key terms should be derived from their contemporary usage.   
Leading commentators support the view that it is legitimate to consider how key 
terms are understood in similar human rights conventions to understand the “ordi-
nary meaning” of key terms.8  Many of the obligations in the ICCPR are based on 
the words of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The ICCPR and the 
European Convention on Human Rights treaties share a similar object and purpose.  
In our view, the European Convention on Human Rights provides a useful guide to 
the contemporary usage of key terms in the ICCPR.     
III RECENT EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE ON                                      
THE RIGHTS OF TRANSSEXUALS 
Unlike the Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights (the 
European Court) has considered the human rights of transsexuals in a number of 
cases.9  A review of these cases reflects a changing understanding of the issues, and 
an emerging consensus in the literature about the medical and social issues sur-
rounding transsexualism. 
Cases before the European Court have raised a number of issues, including whether 
transsexuals have a right to have their new identity recognised by governments, and 
to marry a person of the opposite gender to their chosen gender.   
A Privacy and marriage in the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that: 
                                                        
7
  Sir Robert Jennings QC and Sir Arthur Watts QC, Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed, 1993) 1272-
1273. 
8
  Nowak, above n 3, XXIII. 
9
 See Van Oosterwijck v Belgium (1980) 3 EHRR 557, Rees v UK (1986) 9 EHRR 56; Cossey v UK 
(1990) 13 EHRR 622; B v France (1992) 16 EHRR 1; Sheffield v Horsham v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 163. 
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Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
Article 12 provides that: 
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found 
a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this 
right. 
The first case to consider the rights of transsexuals to privacy and marriage was 
Rees v UK.10  In that case, the European Court considered the social and legal 
situation of the applicant, Mr Rees, a female to male transsexual who had under-
gone hormone therapy and a bilateral mastectomy.  The Court noted that while 
transsexualism was not new, ‘its features have been identified and examined only 
recently’.11  The Court noted that while transsexuals who have ‘been operated upon’ 
form a fairly well defined and identifiable group, there was a lack of consensus 
among Member States about how the law should respond to transsexualism.12  
Accordingly, the Court considered that legal recognition of transsexuals is an area 
where State parties enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.13  The Court held that the 
UK had not violated Mr Rees’ right to privacy by refusing to issue him with birth 
documentation to reflect his change in gender.  The Court considered that ‘for the 
time being’, it was for the UK to determine how best to respond to the needs of 
transsexuals.  Nonetheless, the Court noted the seriousness of the issues facing 
transsexuals and stated that this issue should be kept under review, particularly 
having regard to scientific and societal developments.14 
In Rees, the Court also considered the argument that the applicant’s right to marry 
had been breached, as the applicant (who was living as a man) could not marry a 
woman.  The Court stated that the right to marry in the European Convention on 
Human Rights referred to a traditional marriage between persons of the opposite 
sex.  Also, Article 12 provides that the exercise of this right must be subject to 
national laws.  As the Court did not consider that the UK laws prevented the appli-
cant marrying a person of the opposite sex (presumably another man), there was no 
violation of Article 12.15 
The Rees case was applied in Cossey v UK in 1990 and again in Sheffield and 
Horsham v UK in 1998.  In these cases, the Court referred to a lack of noteworthy 
scientific developments in the area of transsexualism, and continuing uncertainty as 
to the essential nature of transsexualism.16 
                                                        
10
 (1986) 9 EHRR 56.  The Van Oosterwijck case in 1980 raised similar issues but the claim was found to 
be inadmissible, for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
11
  Rees v UK (1986) 9 EHRR 56, 64. 
12
  Ibid 64-65. 
13
  Ibid  67. 
14
  Ibid  67. 
15
  Ibid  68. 
16
  Cossey v UK (1990) 13 EHRR 622, 641.  Sheffield and Horsham v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 163,192. 
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B The Goodwin case 
Rees remained the leading case on the issues of privacy, marriage and transsexual-
ism until 2002.  In that year, the European Court revisited the issues in its landmark 
decision, Christine Goodwin v UK.17  The applicant, a male to female transsexual, 
asked the European Court to consider two key issues: 
• whether the UK had breached its obligation to respect the applicant’s ‘pri-
vate life’ by refusing to legally recognise her gender re-assignment (Arti-
cle 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights); and 
• whether the UK had violated its obligation to ensure the right of men and 
women of marriageable age to marry (Article 12 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights). 
The Court noted that it had considered these issues on several previous occasions.  
However, the Court noted that the Convention exists to protect human rights.  
Accordingly, the Court was willing to look at changing conditions within the UK 
and the EU generally and respond to any ‘evolving convergence as to the standards 
to be achieved’.18  
1 Right to Privacy 
The Court noted that it had on several occasions signalled its consciousness of the 
serious problems facing transsexuals. In Cossey and Sheffield, the Court had 
stressed the importance of keeping this area of the law under review.  Accordingly, 
the Court decided that it would look at the issue of transsexuals and privacy again in 
the light of ‘present-day conditions’.19   
The Court noted the disjuncture between the applicant’s personal and legal situa-
tion.  The applicant had undergone re-assignment surgery and lived as a female, yet 
she remained ‘male’ for all legal purposes.  The Court also noted that the Govern-
ment had put some special procedures in place for her.  However, these special 
procedures drew attention to her status as a transsexual.  The Court noted the stress 
and alienation caused by the disjuncture between her personal and legal situation.  
The Court noted that this conflict may cause feelings of vulnerability, humiliation 
and anxiety.  The Court noted that Ms Goodwin’s surgery was carried out and 
funded by the national health service of the UK.20   
With regard to medical and scientific considerations, the Court noted that there are 
still no conclusive findings about the cause of transsexualism and whether it is 
psychological or physiological.  However, the Court thought it was more significant 
that transsexualism is widely recognised internationally and treatment is available.  
                                                        
17
  (2002) 35 EHRR 18.  See also I v The United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 53, which was handed down 
on the same day as the Goodwin case (11 July 2002). 
18
  Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18, 471-472. 
19
   Ibid 472. 
20
   Ibid 472-473. 
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The Court considered the issue of whether there is any European or international 
consensus about legal recognition following gender re-assignment and noted that: 
In Australia and New Zealand, it appears that the courts are moving away 
from the biological birth view of sex (as set out in the United Kingdom 
case of Corbett v Corbett) and taking the view that sex, in the context of a 
transsexual wishing to marry, should depend on the multitude of factors to 
be assessed at the time of marriage.21 
The Court noted an international trend in favour of increased social acceptance of 
transsexuals and of legal recognition of the new gender identity of post-operative 
transsexuals.22   
The Court contrasted the seriousness of the on-going consequences for the appli-
cant, with the limited impact that changing the birth register laws would have on the 
UK authorities.  Noting that legal recognition of gender change may have important 
repercussions in a number of areas such as family law and employment, the Court 
considered that: 
... society may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience 
to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the 
sexual identity chosen by them at great personal cost.23 
The Court noted that the very essence of the Convention is respect for human dig-
nity and human freedom.  The Court considered that:   
In the twenty first century, the right of transsexuals to personal develop-
ment and to physical and moral security in the full sense enjoyed by others 
in society cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy requiring the 
lapse of time to cast clearer light on the issues involved.  In short, the un-
satisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals live in an in-
termediate zone as not quite one gender or the other is no longer 
sustainable.24 
The Court held that the UK could no longer rely on its margin of appreciation to 
justify refusing to recognise the applicant’s gender reassignment.  The UK had 
failed to respect her right to private life, in breach of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.25 
 
                                                        
21
  Ibid 475. 
22
  Ibid 474-475. 
23
  Ibid 477. 
24
  Ibid 476. 
25
  Ibid 477-478. 
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2 The right to marry   
The Court went on to consider whether Ms Goodwin had been denied the right to 
marry.  The Court noted the line of authorities, including Rees, which held that 
denying a transsexual the ability to marry a person of the opposite sex to their 
chosen sex was not a breach of the right to marry.  Reviewing the situation in 2002, 
the Court observed that the right to marry is not dependent on any ability to con-
ceive children.  Also, getting married gives rise to social, personal and legal conse-
quences.  The Court noted major changes in the institution of marriage since the 
adoption of the Convention, as well as the dramatic changes as a result of science 
and technology in the field of transsexuality.26 
The Court rejected the UK’s argument that Ms Goodwin was not prevented from 
getting married, as she could marry a person of the opposite sex to her birth sex.  
The Court said this argument was ‘artificial’.  The Court noted that: 
The applicant in this case lives as a woman, is in a relationship to a man 
and would only wish to marry a man.  She has no possibility of doing so.  
In the Court’s view, she may therefore claim that the very essence of her 
right to marry has been infringed.27 
The Court noted that fewer countries allow transsexuals to marry than recognise 
their assigned gender.  However, this does not mean that the question of whether 
transsexuals should be permitted to marry should be left to States as being within 
their margin of appreciation: 
This would be tantamount to finding that the range of options open to a 
Contracting State includes an effective bar on any exercise of the right to 
marry.  The margin of appreciation cannot extend so far.28  
The Court considered that it was for States to determine the conditions that have to 
be met for the law to recognise that gender re-assignment has taken place, and the 
formalities that surround marriage.  However, it is not open to States to bar trans-
sexuals from enjoying the right to marry under any circumstances.29 
 
3 Cases since Goodwin 
In 2003, the European Court unanimously reaffirmed its reasoning in the Goodwin 
case in Van Kuck v Germany.30  While there was dissent on the ultimate findings in 
the Van Kuck case, all judges of the European Court referred to the Goodwin case 
as the leading authority on transsexuals and the rights to privacy and marriage. 
                                                        
26
  Ibid  479. 
27
  Ibid  480. 
28
  Ibid  480. 
29
  Ibid 480-481. 
30
  (2003) 37 EHRR 51.   
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C What are the implications for Australia? 
1 Privacy 
Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that: 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private… life.   
 
Article 17(1) of the ICCPR provides that: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his pri-
vacy… 
Despite some differences in wording, the two obligations are basically the same.31  
Both are based on the liberal concepts of individual autonomy and respect for the 
individual.   
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, the question of whether an 
interference with privacy is justifiable depends on whether an appropriate balance 
has been struck between the interests of the individual on the one hand, and the 
interests of the state on the other.   
In the ICCPR, the balancing act is found in the prohibition of ‘arbitrary’ interfer-
ence.  Arbitrariness involves elements of injustice, unpredictability and unreason-
ableness.  As the Human Rights Committee has noted: 
The introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee 
that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with 
the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any 
event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.32  
The question of whether an interference with privacy is justifiable requires a bal-
ancing of the circumstances, bearing in mind the principle of proportionality.33  
 
2 Marriage 
Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that: 
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found 
a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this 
right. 
Article 23(2) of the ICCPR provides that: 
                                                        
31
  Nowak, above n 3, 294. 
32
  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home 
and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation (Article 17), 8 April 1988. 
33
  Nowak, above n 3, 293. 
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The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a 
family shall be recognised. 
Again, the obligation in the ICCPR corresponds largely to Article 12 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.34  However, Article 23(2) of the ICCPR does 
not refer to marriage ‘according to national law’.  According to Nowak, this sug-
gests that any restrictions on the right to marry should be interpreted narrowly. 
Discriminatory prohibitions on marriage would represent a violation of Article 
23(2) in conjunction with Article 2(1). 35 
If Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR are understood in light of the European 
jurisprudence, then Australia is obliged to ensure that its authorities: 
• legally recognise the changed gender of  post-operative transsexuals; and  
• permit the marriage of post-operative transsexuals to persons of the oppo-
site gender to their re-assigned gender. 
These obligations would extend to all branches of government (executive, legisla-
tive and judicial), and at all levels - national, regional and local.36 
It is not clear whether these rights extend to transsexuals who have not undergone 
surgical procedures.  However, there are strong arguments in favour of extending 
the ICCPR rights in this way.  There will be many cases where surgery has little to 
do with whether a person is socially recognised as a man or a woman.  It is consis-
tent with the goal of protecting human dignity to consider the social and cultural 
factors that go towards recognising a person as a man or a woman, rather than only 
what surgery an individual may or may not have had.    
 
IV THE CURRENT SITUATION IN AUSTRALIA 
A Privacy in Australia 
There is no general right to privacy in Australia.  The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) pro-
vides some protection in relation to the collection, storage, use and disclosure of 
personal information by Commonwealth agencies and some private sector bodies.  
However, the protections contained in the Privacy Act are by no means equivalent 
to the right to privacy in the ICCPR.  Nevertheless, as discussed below, State and 
Territory laws in Australia go a significant way towards protecting the kind of 
                                                        
34
  Ibid 407. 
35
  Ibid 410. 
36
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Im-
posed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004. 
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‘privacy’ discussed in the Goodwin case.37  This is because those State and Terri-
tory laws allow many transsexuals to change the sex listed on their birth certificate.  
As a practical matter, most other documents can be amended once an individual’s 
birth certificate has been changed.  This means that those transsexuals who are able 
to change their birth certificate are given the kind of ‘document privacy’ at issue in 
the Goodwin case. 
1 Ability to change birth certificate 
The State and Territory legislation regulating the ability of a transsexual person to 
change the sex noted on their birth certificate varies between jurisdictions.  But all 
jurisdictions currently require some kind of surgical intervention before an individ-
ual’s birth certificate can be changed. 
2 Surgical test 
The Northern Territory, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queen-
sland, Tasmania and Victoria allow transsexuals to change the sex on their birth 
certificate through an administrative process.  These jurisdictions require that the 
transsexual person have had surgery involving the alteration of their reproductive 
organs that was carried out for the purpose of assisting the person to be considered 
a member of the opposite sex.38 Notably, the use of the words ‘to be considered’ 
rather then ‘to consider themselves’ suggests that the considering is done by a 
person other than the transsexual themselves.    
In South Australia and Western Australia the process is more complex and the 
medical or surgical intervention must have ‘altered the genitals and other gender 
characteristics…so that the person will be identified as a person of the opposite 
sex’.39  Again, the ‘identifying’ is carried out by a person other than the transsexual.   
For male to female transsexuals who undergo surgery any of the usual surgical 
procedures (castration, removal of penis and/or creation of vagina) would seem to 
meet the surgical test of any of the jurisdictions because the surgery involves the 
reproductive organs and the genitals.  It is likely that any of these surgeries would 
also ‘assist’ a person to ‘consider’ that the individual who has undergone the sur-
gery is a woman.40  Although we note that it is not as clear whether, particularly in 
                                                        
37
  Note that anti-discrimination legislation in Australia also acts to protect transsexual persons in many 
situations.  However, such legislation is not directly relevant to the changing of birth certificates or to 
marriage which are the focus of this article.  A general examination of transsexuals and anti-
discrimination legislation is beyond the scope of this article.   
38
 See Part 4A of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (NT), Part 4 of the Births, 
Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT), Part 5A of the Births, Deaths and Marriages 
Registration Act 1995 (NSW), Part 4 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (QLD) 
Part 4A of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999 (Tas) and Part 4A of the Births, 
Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic). 
39
  See the Sexual Reassignment Act 1988 (SA) and the Gender Reassignment Act 2000 (WA). 
40
  This of course begs the question of why the ‘assisting’ and ‘considering’ have to be done in such an 
intimate manner.  Our perceptions of most people’s gender are formed when we meet them with their 
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SA and WA, castration alone would be sufficient to allow a person to ‘identify’ (as 
opposed to assist to consider) a person as female.   
The situation is much more problematic for female to male transsexuals.  Female to 
male transsexuals will often have a mastectomy and possibly a hysterectomy.  
However, other surgical procedures are uncommon and in particular phalloplasty 
(the creation of a penis) is complex, expensive and has risks of complications and 
failure.  For these reasons such surgery was considered unnecessary by the Family 
Court of Australia in Re Kevin and Another 41 to recognise that ‘Kevin’ was a man 
for the purpose of marrying a woman.42   
A mastectomy alone will generally allow a female to male transsexual whose sec-
ondary sex characteristics have been masculinised through the taking of testoster-
one to be perceived in social situations as a male.  However, such surgery would 
possibly not meet the test of either group of jurisdictions because breasts are not 
reproductive organs or genitals.  For those States and Territories that allow a person 
to change their birth certificate when they have had ‘surgery involving the repro-
ductive organs’ a hysterectomy (removal of the uterus and, in some cases, the 
ovaries) would seem to meet the test.  However, as noted above, the test in those 
jurisdictions is a two-part test and the surgery must also assist the person to be 
‘considered a member of the opposite sex’.  It is difficult to see how, from a practi-
cal and social perspective, surgery to remove wholly internal reproductive organs (a 
hysterectomy) would assist such a person to ‘be considered a member of the oppo-
site sex’.43  Having said that, an argument can be made that the absence of female 
reproductive organs assists a person to be considered a member of the opposite sex, 
although this seems somewhat artificial.44  It could also be said that committing to 
such major surgery evidences a very strong desire to live as a man and that this 
would assist another person to consider the individual as male.  However, at least in 
the case of female to male transsexuals, it is largely the alteration of secondary sex 
characteristics (through the administration of testosterone) that allow the individual 
to be perceived as male, rather than whether they have had a hysterectomy.45   
                                                                                                                                 
clothes on.  There seems to be little rational explanation of why the gender of transsexual people is to be 
considered with their clothes off.   
41
 (2001) 165 FLR 404. 
42
 Ibid 411, the risks of phalloplasty were noted by Chisholm J.  The Attorney-General in that case did 
not seek to argue that the sex reassignment surgery undertaken by Kevin (mastectomy and hysterectomy) 
was in any way incomplete or unsuccessful.  On appeal in Attorney-General v Kevin and Jennifer (2003) 
172 FLR 300, the Full Federal Court also accepted that phalloplasty was not necessary for Kevin to be 
considered a man for the purpose of the Marriage Act 1961. 
43
 Note that ovulation and menstruation is stopped when a person takes high doses of testosterone to 
masculinise secondary sexual characteristics.  On the issue of the ethics of sterilisation see generally, 
Stephen Whittle, ‘Gemeinschaftremden - or how to be shafted by your friends: Sterilisation Require-
ments and Legal Status Recognition for the Transsexual’ in Leslie J Moran and Daniel Monk (eds) Legal 
Queeries: Lesbian, Gay and Transgender Legal Studies (1999), 43-56.  
44
 No doubt many women with no gender issues who have had a hysterectomy would find such an 
argument either amusing or offensive.   
45
  In Re Kevin Chislolm J emphasised the role of secondary sex characteristics and accepted that ‘as at 
the date of his marriage his secondary sexual characteristics were such that he would have been subject 
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In WA and SA the legislation specifies that the surgery must alter the genitals. The 
terms ‘genitals’ is not defined in either legislation and would therefore have its 
ordinary meaning.  The term ‘genitals’ is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary as 
‘reproductive organs, especially the external organs’ and in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as ‘the external organ or organs of generation’.  If ‘genitals’ in the WA 
and SA legislation is interpreted to mean external organs then female to male trans-
sexuals may not be able to change their birth certificates without having surgery 
which is complex, risky and has a high chance of failure.  Indeed, in light of Re 
Kevin such an interpretation would also produce the anomalous result that some 
individuals may be considered ‘men’ for the purpose of marriage but still unable to 
change their birth certificate. In this regard it is suggested that WA and SA should 
revisit their legislation in order to better consider the position of female to male 
transsexuals.   
It is also worth noting that in Tasmania a re-issued birth certificate is to include a 
notation that the person was previously registered as the other sex.46  This would 
seem to defeat the privacy protection that would otherwise be afforded to transsex-
ual people through changing their birth certificate.   
State and Territory birth certificate legislation goes a long way towards enabling 
male to female post-operative transsexuals in Australia to protect their privacy by 
changing documentation.  However, as discussed above, there are some difficulties 
in applying the surgical test to the circumstances of female to male transsexuals.  In 
particular, the ‘genital’ test used in WA and SA may result in many female to male 
transsexuals being unable to change their birth certificates in those States.  Further-
more, to apply the legislation to female to male transsexuals in the other jurisdic-
tions it is necessary to accept that wholly internal surgery such as a hysterectomy 
somehow enables other people to consider the subject of the surgery a man.  This 
highlights the question of whether surgery is really the most appropriate ‘test’ and 
what privacy rights are afforded to transsexual individuals who are unable or un-
willing to have surgery but nevertheless live in their preferred gender. 
V TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
The case of Attorney-General v Kevin and Jennifer47 stands for the proposition that, 
for the purpose of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), the question whether a person is a 
‘man’ or a ‘woman’ is to be decided as at the date of their marriage (rather than at 
the date of their birth).  Furthermore, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ have their ordinary, 
current meaning according to Australian usage.  The result in this case, in effect, 
                                                                                                                                 
to ridicule if he had attempted to appear in public dressed as a woman, that he could not have entered a 
women’s toilet…’(165 FLR 404, 412) 
46
 Subsection 28D(1) Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999 (Tas).  Although an extract 
from a birth certificate can be obtained without the notation (subsection 28D(2)). 
47
  (2003) 172 FLR 300. 
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means that post-operative transsexuals can marry in their re-assigned gender in 
Australia.  This is consistent with the ICCPR obligations discussed above.   
Since the decision in Attorney-General v Kevin and Jennifer the Marriage Act has 
been amended to specify that a marriage means the ‘union of a man and a woman to 
the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life’.  However, the amend-
ment did not seek to define ‘man’ or ‘woman’.  This suggests that parliament was 
not seeking to change the approach taken in Attorney-General v Kevin and Jennifer 
that those terms have their ordinary meaning.  In other words, although the recent 
amendments may have affected same-sex marriage, the amendments have not 
affected transsexual marriage.  The validity of a marriage involving a transsexual 
therefore continues to turn on whether the individual concerned is a ‘man’ or a 
‘woman’ at the time that they marry according to the ordinary meaning of those 
terms.  It seems clear that the terms ‘man’ and ‘woman’ include a post operative 
transsexual living in the relevant gender.48  A more complex issue is whether the 
term ‘man’ or ‘woman’ could include a pre-operative transsexual.   
A The rights of pre-operative transsexuals49 
The case law in Australia suggests a reluctance to recognise pre-operative trans-
sexuals as belonging to their self-identified gender.50   
There are of course a range of reasons why individuals who regard themselves as 
transsexual may not undergo surgery.  These include the cost of the surgery, the 
health risks involved and, particularly in the case of female to male transsexuals, 
questions as to whether wholly internal surgery will in any way assist them to live 
in their preferred gender.   
In the case of R v Harris and McGuiness51 both Harris and McGuiness were 
charged with being male persons attempting to procure the commission of indecent 
acts.  The main issue was whether they were ‘male persons’.  The evidence was that 
Harris was a post-operative male to female transsexual and McGuiness was a pre-
operative male to female transsexual.  Matthews J expressed ‘the greatest sympathy 
                                                        
48
  It is not clear exactly what surgery a particular individual would need to have to be classified as ‘post-
operative’ but it is likely that a court would be influenced by the test used for changing birth certificates.  
However, as discussed above the test varies between jurisdictions and it is arguable that if Kevin has 
been born in SA or WA he may not have been able to change his birth certificate because he had not had 
‘genital’ surgery.   
49
  For the purpose of this article the term ‘pre-operative’ is used to identify the class of transsexual 
persons who would otherwise be regarded as belonging to their preferred gender but have not had 
surgery involving the reproductive organs for whatever reason.   
50
  See for example R v Harris and McGuiness (1988) 35 A Crim R 146; Secretary, Department of Social 
Security v SRA 118 ALR 474; E v Minister for Health and Faminly Services, Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission, 8 October 1988, No H97/219; SRDD v Secretary, Department of Family and 
Community Services [1999] AAT 626, AAT 25 August 1999; VZG v Secretary, Department of Family 
and Community Services [1999] AATA 298 AAT, 7 May 1999. 
51
  (1988) 35 A Crim R 146. 
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for Ms McGuiness and for others in her predicament’ but considered surgery to be 
necessary because a test not reliant on surgery would:  
… create enormous difficulties of proof, and would be vulnerable to abuse 
by people who were not true transsexuals at all. To this extent it could 
lead to a trivialisation of the difficulties genuinely faced by people with 
gender identification disharmony.52 
This statement may be read as implying that ‘true transsexuals’ are those who 
undergo surgery while those who do not must somehow not have gender identifica-
tion disharmony.  However, there is nothing on the facts of that case to suggest that 
the disharmony felt by McGuiness was any lesser than that experienced by Harris.  
Indeed, it might be that Mc Guinness’ disharmony was greater because of the pres-
ence rather than the absence of her male genitalia.  Further, the ‘difficulties’ faced 
by pre-operative transsexuals cannot be ignored.  This is highlighted by the particu-
lar difficulties faced by transsexual inmates.53   
The judgment in McGuiness and other cases involving pre-operative transsexuals 
suggests a focus on ensuring a test that can be relatively easily applied by the courts 
to categorise people rather than on what steps the law can take to protect the dignity 
and rights of individuals.  However, given the range of so-called ‘sexual reassign-
ment’ procedures54 and the varying standards used to assess what type of surgery is 
required to change, for example a birth certificate, the test of ‘surgery’ is not alto-
gether satisfactory.   
Arguably, the recent decision in Attorney-General v Kevin and Jennifer has gone 
someway towards moving beyond a strictly surgical test and towards a test that 
takes account of social, cultural and a broader range of biological factors including 
‘brain sex’. 55  Such an approach may allow a pre-operative transsexual to be recog-
nised by the law as belonging to their preferred gender.  The judge in the first 
instance was careful to avoid making a ruling on pre-operative transsexuals56 and 
the full Federal Court on appeal likewise gave no answer to the question of whether 
                                                        
52
 Ibid 181-182.  Also see Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA 118 ALR 474 where the 
Federal Court rejected a claim that a pre-operative male to female was a woman.   
53
 See generally Jake Blight, Transgender Inmates, Trends and Issues in Criminal justice No. 168, 
Australian Institute of Criminology (2000); Inquiry into the Death of Catherine Moore, Coroner J 
Abernethy, 21 July 1999, NSW State Coroner’s Court W308 201/99 JI-D1.. 
54
  There is no single ‘sex re-assignment surgery’.  Rather there are a range of procedures available.  For 
example (for male to female): penectomy (removal of penis), orchidectomy (castration), vaginoplasty 
(creation of vagina), clitoroplasty (creation of clitoris), labioplasty (creation of labia), breast augmenta-
tion, scalp advancement and brow position change, orbital rim reduction, cheek augmentation, rhino-
plasty, chin and jaw re-sculpting, thyroid cartlidge reduction (reduction of adam’s apple), thigh and 
buttock augmentation.  And, (for female to male): bilateral mastectomy, hysterectomy and removal of 
ovaries, scrotum construction and testicular implants, phalloplasty (creation of penis), metiotoidaplasty 
(clitoral release), urethroplasty (extension of urethra) and vaginectomy (removal of vagina).   
55
  See the extensive discussion of the medical evidence including that relating to ‘brain sex’ in Re Kevin 
v Attorney-General (2001) 165 FLR 404, 450 -463 and the comment of the Full Federal Court on appeal 
that in light of the evidence about brain sex it was open to Chisholm J to find that transsexualism was 
biologically caused (172 FLR 300, 347-348 and 354-355). 
56
  165 FLR 404, 409. 
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the courts can logically maintain a distinction between pre-operative and post-
operative transsexuals.57  Rather, the position taken by the courts seems to be that 
the question of whether a person is a man or a woman is a question of fact to be 
decided on the facts of each case.   
The facts that led the trial judge to conclude that Kevin was a man at the time of his 
marriage are summarised at p476 of the decision as follows:  
In the present case, the husband at birth had female chromosomes, gonads 
and genitals but was a man for the purpose of the law of marriage at the 
time of his marriage, having regard to all the circumstances and in particu-
lar the following: 
(a) he had always perceived himself to be a male; 
(b) he was perceived by those who knew him to have had male char-
acteristics since he was a young child; 
(c) prior to the marriage he went through a full process of sexual re-
assignment, involving hormone treatment and irreversible sur-
gery, conducted by appropriately qualified medical practitioners; 
(d) at the time of the marriage, in appearance, characteristics and be-
haviour he was perceived as a man, and accepted as a man, by his 
family, friends and work colleagues; 
(e) he was accepted as a man for a variety of social and legal pur-
poses, including name, and admission to an IVF program, and in 
relation to such events occurring after the marriage, there was 
evidence that his characteristics at the relevant times were no dif-
ferent from his characteristics at the time of the marriage; 
(f ) his marriage as a man was accepted, in full knowledge of his cir-
cumstances, by his family, friends and work colleagues. 
On appeal the Full Federal court agreed with these reasons.58 
Notably, of these six factors only one concerns surgery and that refers to both 
surgery and hormone treatment.  This is not to suggest that surgery is an unimpor-
tant factor.  Rather, that surgery is but one factor and that if a case came before the 
courts with facts that showed a person met all of the other factors it may be open to 
the court to conclude that, even in the absence of surgery, they belonged to their 
self-identified gender.  
                                                        
57
 172 FLR 300, 365-366. 
58
 Ibid 365. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
If Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR are understood in light of the European 
jurisprudence, then Australia is obliged to ensure that its authorities: 
• legally recognise the changed gender of a post-operative transsexuals; and  
• permit the marriage of post-operative transsexuals to persons of the oppo-
site gender to their re-assigned gender. 
These obligations would extend to all branches of government (executive, legisla-
tive and judicial), and at all levels - national, regional and local. 
It is not clear whether these rights extend to transsexuals who have not undergone 
surgical procedures.  However, there are strong arguments in favour of extending 
the ICCPR rights in this way.  There will be many cases where surgery has little to 
do with whether a person is socially recognised as a man or a woman.  It is consis-
tent with the goal of protecting human dignity to consider the social and cultural 
factors that go towards recognising a person as a man or a woman and not only 
what surgery an individual may or may not have had.    
In Australia there is State and Territory legislation that enables many post-operative 
transsexuals to change the sex noted on their birth certificate.  This legislation goes 
a long way towards protecting the privacy of post-operative male to female trans-
sexuals.  However, because of the genital surgery requirement in SA and WA 
female to male transsexuals in those jurisdictions are not as well protected.   
Marriage in Australia must be between a ‘man’ and a ‘woman’.  For the purpose of 
the Marriage Act those terms have their ordinary contemporary meaning.  The 
question of whether a person is a ‘man’ or a ‘woman’ is to be assessed at the date of 
their marriage, not at the date of their birth.  The matters that a court can take into 
account in deciding whether a person is a ‘man’ or a ‘woman’ include social, cul-
tural, biological and surgical factors.  The leading case on this issue in Australia 
concerns a post-operative transsexual.  However the case leaves it open to future 
courts to consider whether a pre-operative transsexual may be able to marry in their 
self-identified gender.   
  
 
